“Sid, the meeting will take place in the Foreign Secretary’s official residence, within sight of Buckingham Palace.” Those words launched me on a whirlwind trip, forty-eight hours from the time I left my home in California to London and back to my doorstep.
First, some context. My prior newsletters introduced my role in developing the ITWG (International Technical Working Group). Nine years after its founding, I increasingly felt a need to expand the ITWG beyond the original, mostly European and former Soviet Union countries. I believed the world needed to increase the use of nuclear power to address global warming, and Asia was already heading in that direction. Thus, the need for nuclear forensics was a global need. I wasn’t comfortable deciding on my own to expand to other countries, so I sought to establish some type of political backing for this type of ITWG issue.
The U.S. State Department played a critical role in establishing the ITWG, and throughout my years leading the group, I kept the U.S. State Department appraised of my activities. So I first raised the issue with my liaison in State. The response was an invitation to brief officials two (or maybe three) levels above my liaison. At the briefing, these higher level officials didn’t answer my questions directly. Instead, they arranged for me to brief the G-8’s Nonproliferation Experts Group (NPEG), the same group that provided the impetus for the birth of the ITWG.
In time, they informed me the meeting would take place in London on April 1, 2005 (I wondered about the significance of the date). I invited my new ITWG co-chair to join me, and upon landing in London, we met over dinner to finalize our plan for the next day.
Our briefing began by giving an update on the ITWG’s efforts to promote international cooperation in developing nuclear forensics. I ended by giving them my vision for international cooperation, namely, “to maximize the global ability to detect early warning signs of nuclear terrorist activity and to draw upon global expertise for actual investigations.” And by the way, since you are presumably looking forward to reading my nuclear forensics thriller, this vision plays a prominent role in the novel.
Then I posed the two-part question I hoped they would answer—should the ITWG develop a political advisory group and should we invite more countries to join the ITWG? They prefaced their answer by saying we were by far the most technical group they had ever dealt with (this comment surprised me, since we designed our briefing to be light on the technical aspects). The NPEG was decidedly cool to the idea of a political advisory group, and they certainly didn’t see themselves in that role. They advised us to keep the ITWG “politically pure,” as that would enhance the group’s usefulness.
Rather disappointed, though not greatly surprised, I pressed the second issue. I didn’t want to get back on the airplane without some political guidance on expanding the ITWG. Their initial response was along the lines of “that seems like a good idea to explore.”
I thought to myself, “What the heck does that mean?” I pushed them to be more specific. I asked, “Should we invite India and Pakistan?” I figured that by posing the possibility of inviting these two long-term adversaries with nuclear arsenals, I would get insight to what they were really thinking.
The NPEG members looked at one another, and then one offered, “If you think that’s a good idea.” Other members nodded their agreement. I was stunned! They didn’t even blink at my suggestion. It seemed they were encouraging me to step forward, without directly saying, “Yes, you should invite them.”
I decided to push a little more. “What about inviting China?” Again, they replied, ”If you think that’s a good idea.”
OK, I had my answer. They were enthusiastic about ITWG’s progress and wanted us to keep going. And when it came to expanding the scope of participation, go for it. But if things went awry, it was on our heads, not theirs.
The ITWG’s Executive Committee responded by inviting new countries to participate. Jumping forward to 2014, nine years later, the International Atomic Energy Agency hosted the first international conference focused solely on nuclear forensics. The conference attracted 335 participants from 88 countries, a rather heartening sight for me given the humble origins of the ITWG. The conference also recognized that the ITWG was the de facto driver of the technical development of nuclear forensics. I left that conference grateful for how far the ITWG had come in a relatively short time. I hasten to add, though, that much remains to be accomplished in both the scientific and political arenas to establish nuclear forensics as a broadly accepted, key element of nuclear security. I hope A Dangerous Gamble will help to make that point.